Florida Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 2

Article 2

March 1986

Response to Rodgers
Richard Hamann

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Hamann, Response to Rodgers, 38 Fla. L. Rev. 205 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Hamann: Response to Rodgers

RESPONSE TO RODGERS
RIcHARD HAMANN*

Robert Axelrod's work on the evolution of cooperation, offers an insightful
perspective for environmental lawyers and Professor Rodgers explicates it well.
An understanding of human behavior is essential to devising effective strategies
for environmental protection. Game theory helps to explain and predict the
choices people make and can help us devise strategies for encouraging beneficial
behavior, but the limitations of Axelrod's methods should be considered in
2
assessing the applicability of his results.
Axelrod's method was to test a variety of computer programs submitted by
numerous game theorists embodying different approaches to an iterated prisoner's dilemma. The rules of the game are simple. Each player has a choice:
to defect or cooperate, which must be made without knowing the other player's
move. If both players cooperate, they each receive more points than if both
defect. If one defects and the other cooperates, however, the defector gets more
points than if both had cooperated, while the cooperative party gets none, the
"sucker's payoff." If the game is played just once, mutual defection is the
rational consequence although mutual cooperation would yield greater rewards.
Neither player can risk becoming the sucker. But Axelrod's computers were
programmed to repeat the play over a relatively large, but unspecified number
of moves, making the game an iterated prisoner's dilemma. Each player could
thus respond to the opposing program's history of moves. In this situation,
3
cooperation flourished and the program TIT-FOR-TAT prevailed.
TIT-FOR-TAT cooperated on the first move and duplicated the other player's previous move on all subsequent moves. It thus rewarded cooperation,
retaliated against defection, and amassed more points than any other strategy.
As Axelrod demonstrated, TIT-FOR-TAT can invade and expand in a population of other strategies and maintain itself against invasion by less cooperative
strategies. Thus, cooperative behavior can evolve.
TIT-FOR-TAT has four characteristics fostering its success that should be
considered in the development of strategies for environmental protection. It
begins by playing cooperatively. By never defecting first, it avoids triggering
retribution. But, TIT-FOR-TAT is provocable. It retaliates promptly in response to a defection and thus discourages exploitive attempts. TIT-FOR-TAT
is also forgiving. It responds just as promptly to cooperation by cooperating
and thus terminates a pattern of retribution. Finally, it is clear. The pattern
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is easily ascertained. Retaliation is certain to follow a defection and cooperation
is always the response to cooperative behavior. Given the relative payoffs, a
pattern of cooperation becomes the best behavioral strategy to adopt in response
to TIT-FOR-TAT.
So what is the relevance to environmental law? First, the results indicate
the protection of shared natural resources may sometimes be accomplished without the intervention of a central authority through cooperative behavior. For
example, consider a neighborhood in which one deer moves from yard to yard
and in which hunting is allowed by law. All of the neighbors enjoy the animal's
presence, yet also enjoy venison. If all of them cooperate by not killing the
deer, they will have established a sanctuary. If one defects and seizes the meat,
the others get the suckers payoff. They may defect in turn (refusing to loan
the lawnmower, withholding social invitations, etc.). Provided that killing the
neighborhood deer is known to be a defection, that the negative payoffs of a
reciprocal defection are sufficiently high (compared to the benefits of venison),
and that reciprocity is the expected behavior, the deer sanctuary can be established and maintained.
The limits of reciprocity as a basis for establishing such cooperative behavior
must also be realized. The specific conditions of the iterated prisoners' dilemma
must be present or strategies other than TIT-FOR-TAT will prevail. There
must be a strong probability of continued interactions. Defection on the last
move of a defined series is very tempting. The neighbor who is about to move
to another community may not fear retribution for taking the deer. Similarly,
the reward for defection cannot exceed the value discounted to the present of
future cooperation. If it does, defection again becomes attractive.
Environmental regulation can be viewed as a means of altering the rules
of the game so as to make cooperation (compliance with environmental standards) a more attractive strategy than defection (violation). 4 Regulation extends
the potential for future interactions and increases the negative payoffs of defection. Consider, for example, water pollution control. In the cooperative mode,
government enacts reasonable regulations with which the regulated interests
comply. If the government's pollution control strategy does not resemble TITFOR-TAT or if the underlying conditions are not those of the iterated prisoners'
dilemma, compliance may be weakened and the environmental goals not accomplished.
Cooperation evolves only if there are repeated interactions. Rodgers recognizes this in the drifter/habitu6 distinction. The fly-by-night operator, the
gypsy waste hauler or the pirate tanker are not encouraged to cooperate in the
protection of environmental resources. They can defect, take their payoff and
leave, thus terminating the game. Extending the interaction, thus giving the
government an opportunity to reciprocate, is essential to ensuring cooperation.
Performance bonding, for example, creates a target for enforcement action.
Expanding the scope of jurisdiction (for example from a local to national scale)

4. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAw & Soc'y
Riv. 179 (1984).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss2/2

2

Hamann: Response to Rodgers
19861

RESPONSE TO RODGERS

gives the government an opportunity to continue the game despite significant
geographic movement of the player. The lesson emphasized by Rodgers is that
the transformation from drifter to habitue, with continuing ties to the regulatory
jurisdiction, enhances the likelihood of compliance with environmental regulations.
Other conditions must also be met, however, for cooperation to flourish.
Otherwise, we might reasonably expect to find industrial dischargers, whose
investments in fixed capital facilities are often large, to have excellent records
of compliance. Perhaps the compliance record is better than that of the fly-bynight operators, but it is often poor. To understand why, we must consider
some of the other conditions specified by Axelrod for the evolution of cooperation.
The best strategy for a player to use is relative. It depends on the strategy
being used by the other player. Reciprocity is the key to fostering cooperation.
If the government fails to retaliate in response to violations, a strategy will
likely evolve to take advantage of that weakness by defecting rather than cooperating. Ideally, every violation should result in a penalty (a counter-defection)
sufficient to offset the gains of defection. If the government's strategy is to
withhold enforcement action until violations have accumulated in number or
severity (two or more tits for a tat), then the best strategy for the regulated
interest to use is one that seizes the gains of defection. Defection, not cooperation, is thus promoted.
Clarity is another necessary condition. TIT-FOR-TAT was successful because it responded to both cooperation and defection unambiguously. The response to either move could be clearly anticipated. The government's strategy
for enforcing environmental laws seldom has such clarity. The discharger of
water pollutants, for example, is not confronted with a clear enforcement strategy. Enforcement too often depends on excessive discretion and response to the
winds of political change. If it is not clear that defection on the part of the
polluter will lead to defection by the government, strategies other that TITFOR-TAT become the most successful. Many of the strategies evaluated by
Axelrod, for example, would defect to secure opportunistic gains or to gauge
the response of the other player. Failure to retaliate in kind would encourage
further defections.
Another kind of clarity implicit in the rules of Axelrod's iterated prisoners'
dilemma was the payoff for defections. In contrast, it is extremely difficult to
predict the sanctions that will actually be imposed for violating pollution control
or other environmental protection laws. An encouraging trend, which seems
likely to promote cooperation, is the adoption by agencies of policies for setting
penalties.5 The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, for example,
has begun using a matrix-based scoring system to assess penalties for hazardous
waste violations. 6 Use of the system shifts discussion from the subject of what
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is a fair penalty to the more objective realm of categorizing the violation. By
increasing the predictability of the penalty, the strategy promotes cooperation.
In considering the evolution of cooperation in natural resources law, it is
important to keep in mind that cooperation is not always desirable. Rodgers
discusses the possibility of socially harmful cooperation which should be discouraged. There may be a cooperative payoff for government regulators, as
individuals or institutionally, for example, in not prosecuting violators or in
not seeking appropriate penalties. In such a case, the benefits of cooperation
do not redound to the public. Statutory provisions authorizing citizen suits to
enforce environmental standards are a mechanism for circumventing such cooperation and ensuring appropriate retaliation in response to defection. Although
Rodgers criticizes citizen enforcers as likely to seek "literal and unforgiving
enforcement" and "letter of the law rectitude," perhaps the process would work
better if such enforcement were the norm.
Enforcement discretion creates ambiguity regarding whether retaliation will
result from defection and what the resulting payoff is likely to be. The imposition
of penalties calibrated proportionally to the severity of the violation and certain
to result, according to Axelrod, fosters cooperative behavior. Penalties, however,
must be fair or another round of defections is likely to result (refusal to settle,
for example).' The best strategy for encouraging compliance, therefore, is to
establish clear guidelines for penalizing violations that are responsive to legitimate differences in conditions and to increase the certainty of retaliation in
response to violations by encouraging citizen suits when government fails to
seek the specified penalties.
Game theory provides a useful perspective for analyzing the enforcement of
environmental law, but its limitations must be considered. The iterated prisoners' dilemma is a simple game; the natural world and our society are extraordinarily complex. TIT-FOR-TAT was a successful strategy in Axelrod's
simulations. But the conditions under which it is successful are very specific
and different in many respects from those existing in the "real world" in which
environmental law is enforced. The probability of future interactions is often
low. Violations may not be detected or the identity of violators may be concealed. The value of a defection is often high relative to the discounted value
of probable future cooperation. Some aspects of environmental regulation are
a zero-sum game, in which cooperation does not result in mutual benefits.
Litigation to collect a penalty, for example, seems more similar to chess, the
classic zero-sum game, than to the prisoners' dilemma. The participants may
not be rationally motivated or strategic thinkers. They always have incomplete
information. Communication and the development of enforceable, express agreements is possible. Nevertheless, as Professor Rodgers concludes, game theory
and the work of Robert-Axelrod contain a rich lode of understanding which
students of environmental law can profitably mine.
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